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Abstract 
We argue that if one wishes to be a realist, one should adopt a realist ontology involving tropes 
instead of a Russellian ontology of property universals and objects. Either Russellian realists 
should adopt relata-specific relational tropes of instantiation instead of facts, or, better, convert 
to Neo-Aristotelian realism with monadic tropes. Regarding Neo-Aristotelian realism, we have 
two novel points why it fares better than Russellian realism. (1) Instantiation of property 
universals by tropes, and characterisation or inherence between tropes and objects, are more 
transparent ontological notions than relational inherence, which is assumed in Russellian 
realism with the relational tropes of instantiation. (2) Neo-Aristotelian realism makes better 
sense about abstract universals, which are a more viable option than concrete universals. 
keywords: metaphysics, ontology, realism, universals, tropes 
1. Introduction 
 
Let us call "mainstream realism" any realist view about universals which subscribes to two 
general claims: first, there cannot be uninstantiated universals; second, in addition to 
universals, there is also some irreducible category of particulars that instantiate these 
universals.1 In the present article, we argue that mainstream realists need to introduce property 
or relation tropes in order to account for the instantiations of property universals. Moreover, 
we argue that the best currently available forms of mainstream realism introduce property 
tropes as instances of monadic universals. 
By the qualification mainstream realism, we rule out two different types of realist 
position.  First,  we  do  not  take  up  "Platonic realism",  which  allows  for  the  possibility  of  
                                               
1 For the sake of the argument, in this paper we follow the contemporary realist’s way of drawing the distinction 
between universals and particulars. Universals can be instantiated, whereas particulars cannot have instances. See, 
e.g., Lowe (2006, 89). 
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uninstantiated universals. Hence, we consider only "Aristotelian" immanent realist views, on 
which universals generically depend for their existence upon their particular instances. Second, 
we do not consider “bundle theories”, which attempt to analyse individual objects (or, 
substances) as bundles of property universals. Bundle theories are forms of immanent realism 
but have a serious prima facie difficulty of explaining of how there can be two distinct objects 
(considered as bundles of universals) with exactly the same monadic properties. Although 
different versions of bundle theory have been proposed to solve this problem, we will not go 
into the debate of assessing the merits of these proposals.2 Similarly, since Platonic realism is 
not a commonly held metaphysical position on universals at the moment, we concentrate on 
Aristotelian (immanent) realism in the present article.3 
Among the different forms of (mainstream) immanent realism, there are two mutually 
orthogonal distinctions.4 First, E. J. Lowe (2006, 98-99) divides immanent realism into two 
types, ‘strong’ and ‘weak’, depending on how the immanence of universals ‘in’ their particular 
instances is understood. According to strong immanent realism (Lowe 1998, 156; cf. 2006, 98-
99), universals are literally in their concrete instances, hence themselves concrete, that is, 
spatio-temporal (e.g. Smith 1997). By contrast, weak immanent realism maintains that 
universals are abstract, that is, non-spatio-temporal (Bergmann 1967, 49; Ellis 2001, 73-76; 
Lowe 2006, 99).  
The second distinction, between the Russellian and the Neo-Aristotelian (immanent) 
realism concerns the very nature of instantiation.  Russellians consider property universals as 
directly instantiated by objects or bare particulars, whereas Neo-Aristotelians believe that 
property universals are instantiated by tropes or modes (particular properties), which in turn 
characterise objects.5 Hence, Neo-Aristotelians (Smith 1997; Lowe 1998, 2006, 2009; Ellis 
                                               
2 Among the recent defences of (different forms of) bundle theory are Van Cleve (1985), Paul (2002), Rodriguez-
Pereyra (2004). 
3 Cf. Berman (2008) and Tugby (2013) for recent defenses of Platonic realism. 
4 In what follows, since we concentrate on mainstream realism, we will leave out the qualification.  
5 Lowe prefers “mode” to “trope” as he thinks that particular properties are objects’ ways of being, which is not 
true of tropes in every trope theory (1998, 78; 2006, 14-15). Nevertheless, henceforth we will use only “trope”. 
When instantiation in the Neo-Aristotelian framework is discussed, the categorial difference between tropes and 
modes is not relevant. 
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2001) account for the instantiations of universals by means of tropes but all prominent 
Russellians have rejected the existence of tropes.  
Most Russellian realists are factualists (e.g., Bergmann 1967; Hochberg 1978; 
Armstrong 1997). Factualists identify the instantiations of universals with complex particulars 
belonging to a further ontological category, facts (states of affairs). In section 2, we argue that 
the factualist account of the instantiations of property universals fails. Factualists are unable to 
specify any intrinsic feature of facts on the basis of which one could consider facts as unities 
and distinct from mere sums of their constituents. In order to show how this difficulty can be 
overcome, we propose a new variant of Russellian realism that replaces facts as connecting 
entities with simple particulars, relational tropes of instantiation. 
We  argue  that  the  introduction  of  relational  tropes  of  instantiation  amounts  to  a  
significant improvement of Russellian realism. However, the instantiations of property 
universals by concrete objects are themselves concrete, as we argue in section 3.  By contrast, 
the best available theories of universals consider universals as abstract. Since universals are, 
according to Russellian realism, constituents of their concrete instantiations, this metaphysical 
view is left with the difficult problem of explaining how abstract universals can be constituents 
of their concrete instantiations. In section 4, we argue that the best answer to these difficulties 
is to adopt the Neo-Aristotelian account of instantiations of properties as property tropes which 
stand in a single formal relation of instantiation to abstract property universals. 
 
2. Factualism 
 
The current versions of Russellian realism introduce objects or bare particulars and property 
universals, and possibly ‘ties’ or ‘nexus’, but reject tropes. Property universals are directly 
instantiated or exemplified by objects or bare particulars. Russellians take the relation of 
instantiation or exemplification as either primitive or grounded. On the latter option, one may 
distinguish two forms of Russellian realism, the dual-constituent and the triple-constituent 
5 
 
view. The dual-constituent version explains instantiation by reference to the existence of an 
entity over and above objects and universals: a fact. Both facts and objects are concrete, but 
universals are considered either as abstract or concrete. It is sufficient here to focus on atomic 
facts that are considered as complex entities, which are constituted by object a and property 
universal F whenever a instantiates F.6 
To this scheme, Bergmann (1967, 11, 14, 22-23, 44-45), Hochberg (1978, 339) and J.P. 
Moreland (2001, ch.5) add another universal, the fundamental tie or nexus of exemplification.7 
Its theoretical role is to connect a bare particular and a universal property in a fact. On this 
triple-constituent factualism, the entity instantiating the property is thus a bare particular, a bare 
individuator, not an ordinary object. Bergmann, Hochberg and Moreland think that ordinary 
objects are complex facts constituted by the instantiations of monadic properties by a bare 
particular. An atomic fact consists in a bare particular instantiating a monadic property 
universal. On this view, both ordinary objects and their constituent atomic facts are particulars. 
The proposed versions of Russellian realism are partly motivated by solving a version of 
the problem generally known as Bradley’s relation regress (cf. Bradley 1897, 18). Assume that 
object a has a property F contingently, which means that a and F (and tie E) can exist without 
being connected to each other (a could be not-F). From this, it seems to follow that there has 
to be an ontological ground for a instantiating F; the mere co-existence of a and F is  not  
sufficient for a instantiating F. This ground is that a and F (and E) are connected by a third 
entity: the relation of first-order instantiation that connects a and F (and E). But now we face 
another call for explanation: what is the ontological ground for the fact that a and F (and E) are 
connected by the relation of first-order instantiation? In order to account for that, we must 
introduce a three-place (four-place) instantiation relation to connect instantiation and the 
                                               
6 The dual-constituent view is a modification of but not identical to Armstrong’s ontology in 1997. If universals 
are abstract in the the dual-constituent view, one major difference is that Armstrong says that all universals are 
“far from removed from spacetime”, which suggests that they are concrete (part of the space-time system) 
(Armstrong 1997, 40). By contrast, an advocate of weak immanent realism explicitly assumes that they are 
abstract. On both views, particulars, properties and relations must be constituents of some (but not any particular) 
fact (or, state of affairs) but facts are complex entities having exactly these constituents. Note that Armstrong's 
(2004) partial identity view of instantiation, which he rejected later, does not introduce facts in this sense. We do 
not discuss it since Armstrong himself abandoned it. 
7 Hochberg (2009, 103) changes his earlier view and replaces the nexus with compresence. 
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entities it relates, namely, a and F (and E),  and so on. Thus,  in order to give an ontological 
ground for one instantiation, we must postulate an infinite number of instantiation relations 
(Armstrong 1997, sec. 8.12). This infinite regress is vicious since at no point do we reach an 
explanatory closure. Hence, we have not shown that it is possible that a and F (and E) are 
connected by the relation of instantiation. 
Facts are entities designed to block Bradley’s regress (cf., e.g., Bergmann 1967, 6-12; 
Armstrong 1997, sec. 8.12; Hochberg 1978, 336-340). The main idea is that the existence of a 
fact suffices to stop the regress before it gets started. The instantiation of F by object or bare 
particular a amounts to the existence of the fact that Fa, which is a complex, third entity having 
these two constituents (e.g. Armstrong 1997, 20, 28-9). F is instantiated by a because the fact 
Fa exists (Ibid.). In Bergmann’s, and Hochberg’s earlier, triple-constituent view, the tie of 
exemplification is a connector that can connect without itself being connected. Tie E connects 
a and F without launching Bradley’s regress because its connecting a and F amounts to the 
existence of the fact that E ties a and F. Both the dual-constituent and triple-constituent view 
are supposed to avoid Bradley’s regress, since there is no need for a fourth or fifth entity (e.g., 
the relation of instantiation) that would ground instantiation. So factualism appears to be a 
promising way to avoid Bradley’s regress. It seems that facts are, indeed, possible entities. 
Still, the factualist's putative answer to Bradley’s regress has been heavily criticized 
(Betti 2014, Dodd 1999, 155; MacBride 2011, 172; Maurin 2010, 2012; Vallicella 2002; 
Wieland & Betti 2008). We will not repeat all these criticisms. Instead, we will concentrate on 
two problems pertaining to facts: the first is the unity-in-complexity problem, to explain why 
facts can be considered to form a unity. Why are they unities in contradistinction to aggregates 
of their constituents, which are pluralities? The second problem concerns the alleged category 
distinction between facts and other complex entities. What is the ontological ground of this 
category distinction? We will argue that as these problems do not have any clear solution, it is 
better to postulate simple particulars, the relational tropes of instantiation. 
A fact is rigidly existentially dependent on its constituents since it could not exist without 
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precisely those entities that are its constituents.8 By contrast, the existence of the fact is 
contingent relative to the existence of its constituents; the constituents do not depend rigidly 
for their existence on each other or the fact. So the constituents cannot account for the 
possibility or actuality of their being connected by the fact. The only entity in factualism that 
can do this ontological work is the fact itself, which is exactly what the factualists suppose it 
to do. According to factualism, when a fact exists, its constituents are, indeed, connected by 
the fact (on the dual-constituent view, a does instantiate F) and the fact is a connecting entity 
that is an “addition of being” in comparison to its constituents. 
Thus, fact Fa is stipulated to exist whenever a instantiates F. It is a complex entity whose 
exact function is to connect a and F, that is, to explain the instantiation of the property F by 
the particular a. In this sense, facts are an ad hoc postulation – the primary reason to introduce 
facts is to account for the instantiations of Russellian universals by particulars and stop 
Bradley’s regress.9 Since a similar complaint might be directed against the entities postulated 
in rival ontological category systems, this is perhaps not a fatal objection to factualism. 
However, our aim is to show that facts are a non-transparent ad hoc postulation. 
According to factualism, facts not only connect their constituents (ground instantiation). 
They are also complex unities, single entities that have existing non-identical constituents (e.g. 
Armstrong 1997, 122; Hochberg 2009, 107). Accordingly, as Maurin argues, factualists face 
not only the problem of Bradley’s regress but also the unity-in-complexity problem (2012, 801-
2).10  
                                               
8 Cf. Simons (1987, 294-300) for the notions of rigid and generic dependence. 
9 One might claim that facts have independent semantic functions. First, facts are often claimed to be introduced 
as truthmakers of the true atomic truth-bearers (e.g., propositions) (cf. Armstrong 1997, ch.8). Second, one might 
suggest that true truth-bearers are in a correspondence relation to facts as certain correspondence theories of truth 
seem to maintain, cf. David 2013. However, unless we assume a close parallel between the structure of truth-
bearers and the structure of reality, neither of these functions can be considered as independent reasons to 
introduce facts. Rather, they are by-products of the alleged function to explain instantiations of Russellian 
universals. 
 
10 Vallicella (2002, 18ff.) also takes up a version of the unity problem with regard to facts and argues for the 
conclusion that facts as unities cannot exist independently of "external unifiers": factors external to facts which 
unify them. Nevertheless, he accepts two theses to which we will not subscribe. First, claiming that facts have 
certain constituents contradicts the contention that they are entities additional to the plurality of their constituents. 
Second, we contest the claim that Armstrong's truthmaker argument gives us strong reasons to maintain that there 
are facts as entities dependent on external unifiers. For one, we will argue that factualist claims are implausible 
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In order to see if factualists can answer the unity-in-complexity problem, let us not 
suppose, for the sake of the argument, that facts are actual and hence possible as complex 
unities. But let us suppose that their constituents on the dual-constituent view are actual: there 
are objects and property universals (this is also true on the factualist assumption that there are 
facts). From this supposition, it follows that there are also aggregates (or pluralities) of objects 
and property universals such as the plurality of a and F. As pluralities, these aggregates are not 
unities: they are not single entities over and above their members. If a and F exist, there need 
not be a third entity, namely, sum a+F, which would be an individual and hence a unity.  
By contrast, according to factualism, when there is the fact Fa, there is a third entity in 
addition to a and F. If we assume both the existence of sum a+F and fact Fa, as Armstrong 
(1997, ch.8) does, there are two distinct entities having exactly the same essential constituents. 
While sum a+F is also identical with the aggregate of its constituents, fact Fa is not.11 More 
generally, then, facts are categorially distinct from the sums of their constituents. By the same 
token, they are assumed to have a stronger unity than mere sums of their constituents – facts 
are assumed to connect their constituents in an instantiation of a universal by a particular. 
Hence, the factualist faces two difficult questions: first, why is it possible that facts are such 
distinct unities? What is the further factor besides the existence of the constituents that makes 
facts distinct unities? Second, what is the ontological ground of the categorial distinction 
between facts and aggregates of their constituents? 
 One proposed answer to the second question is to stipulate that this category distinction 
is a brute fact and that there cannot be any ontological explanation for it (cf. Hochberg 1978, 
338).  But if the distinctness is a brute fact, fact Fa is entirely distinct from plurality F, a or 
sum a+F. The fact and the sum are assumed to have exactly the same constituents; yet they are 
                                               
(conductive to non-transparent primitives and new serious problems) but not manifestly contradictory; for two, in 
order to account for the instantiations of properties, one need not postulate facts.  
11 The claim that some aggregate of entities is identical with the entity the plurality composes is, of course, 
contestable and requires generalization of the notion of identity to hybrid cases, namely, to identities between 
aggregates of distinct individuals and individuals (cf. Noonan & Curtis 2014: sec. 7). A weaker, and less 
contestable, claim would be that (at least in some cases) a plurality of certain entities composes a further entity, 
their mereological sum, and that the composition relation is analogous to the identity relation. Here, it suffices to 
point out that, unlike complex concrete particulars, facts are not identical with the mereological sums of their 
constituents. 
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supposed to be entirely distinct entities that belong to distinct categories. Nevertheless, we 
cannot just stipulate that certain complexes are “facts”, which beyond this are indistinguishable 
from complexes called “mereological sums”. Unless this category distinction is based on some 
intrinsic factor in the entities introduced, we cannot bring any clarity to our ontological 
category system. Unless we can account for the unity of facts as contrasted with sums, it is of 
no help to just call certain complexes facts and claim that there is a primitive category 
distinction.12 Hence an adequate answer to the unity problem would lead to a successful 
elucidation of the categorial nature of facts as special kinds of complex entities. 
As far as we know, the only proposed factualist attempt to elucidate the nature of facts 
as special kinds of complexes is in terms of “non-mereological mode of composition” 
(Armstrong 1997, 118ff). The idea is that the non-mereological mode of composition 
distinguishes facts as unities from the aggregates or, alternatively, the mereological sums of 
their constituents. The composition of facts is “non-mereological” because it does not obey the 
laws of classical extensional mereology. The crucial differences between facts and the 
“mereologically” constituted entities such as sums are, first, that two distinct facts may well be 
constituted by exactly the same constituents (mereological extensionality fails), and second, 
that the possible constituents of a fact may well fail to constitute a fact (the composition of 
facts is restricted).13 
The whole idea of “non-mereological composition” rests on a negative characterisation 
of the composition of facts. As such, the talk about non-mereological composition specifies the 
mereological principles which do not hold in the case of facts but does not spell out why facts 
are distinct from mereological sums. Compare Armstrong’s doctrine of non-mereological 
composition with the non-mereological conditions introduced for the parts of a complex object 
                                               
12 Maurin (2012, 801-2) makes the controversial claim that categorial differences in more than one-category 
ontologies are brute and not explicable in terms of something else. However, she does observe that when two 
entities are “intimately related”, e.g., by having the same essential constituents, as in the case of facts and 
mereological sums, their categorial difference cannot be brute. 
13 Bergmann (1967, 9) does not accept the existence of mereological sums; according to him, “[a] collection of 
entities is as such itself not an entity”. According to Bergmann, all complex entities are facts, which are built from 
simples by means of the tie(s) of exemplification. 
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to spell out when they satisfy the conditions of a restricted composition.14 In both cases, the 
composition is restricted and hence “non-mereological”. However, the metaphysicians 
discussing restricted composition of objects attempt to explain when composition can take 
place by recourse to some further facts. By contrast, for Armstrong, the occurrence of every 
instance of non-mereological composition is a brute fact which cannot be elucidated in terms 
of something else. It cannot be non-circularly explained in terms of a particular instantiating a 
universal. Facts and their “non-mereological composition” are supposed to account for the 
instantiations of universals but not vice versa.15 Hence, the existence of every new fact and the 
categorial distinction between mereological sums and facts is a brute fact. 
Mereological sums are the best candidates for entities partially identical with their 
constituents.16 Since two distinct atomic facts can have exactly the same constituents, it does 
not make sense to speak about partial identity of facts with their constituents having the full 
identity as its limiting case. Hence, we cannot account for the co-location of a fact with its 
constituents or the rigid dependence of a fact on its constituents by means of partial identity. 
So, we should ask: is it reasonable to consider facts as complex entities at all, i.e., constituted 
by their alleged constituents? 
Consider the following alternative. Instead of facts, the Russellian realist postulates 
relational tropes of instantiation accounting for each specific instantiation of a universal by a 
particular. Like facts, the relational tropes of instantiation would be particulars. More 
specifically,  they would be tropes,  the assumption of which would violate the claim that all  
properties and relations are universals. However, relational tropes of instantiation would be 
introduced for exactly the same ontological work as facts. They would account for the 
instantiations of universals by particulars. An instantiation trope would be relata specific in the 
                                               
14 Cf. van Inwagen (1990) and the resulting philosophical discussion of the different answers to van Inwagen’s 
Special Composition Question. 
15 Officially,  Armstrong (1997,  ch.  8)  introduces  facts  (in  his  terms,  states  of  affairs)  to  act  as  truthmakers  of  
contingent propositions. However, their main ontological function is to account for the instantiation of Russellian 
universals by particulars. Moreover, the existence of every fact is a brute fact, i.e., not explainable in terms of 
something else. 
16 According to Armstrong (1997, 17-18), the constitution of complex particulars obeys the principles of classical 
extensional mereology and we can speak of the partial identity of complex particulars with their parts having 
identity (i.e., the sameness of parts) as its limiting case. 
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following sense: its nature is to connect a and F by way of instantiation, its existence entails 
that it is rigidly dependent on a and F and it relationally inheres in them. Therefore the existence 
of instantiation trope i entails that a certain universal F is instantiated by a certain particular a. 
Nevertheless, relational tropes of instantiation would not have the further unexplainable 
features of facts such as their own special kind of composition and unity. As primitive entities, 
the relational tropes of instantiation do not have any kind of constituents. They are simple 
individuals and hence unities. 
Considering facts as complex entities seems not to bring any ontological explanatory 
benefits for the Russellian realist. Or, to be more cautious, the (alleged) benefits related to the 
semantic correspondence intuition are overweighed by the deeply non-transparent nature of 
fact composition. On the other hand, considering “facts” as primitive connecting entities means 
the rejection of facts as complex entities. It amounts to the introduction of the relational tropes 
of instantiation described in the previous paragraph. 
Consequently, our conclusion is that factualists have not been able to show that facts 
are possible, not to speak of their actuality. It would not do to insist that it is a starting point of 
factualism that there are facts as unities, constituted and connecting entities. This would put 
the cart before the horse. Rather, the Russellian realist can replace facts with relational tropes 
of instantiation. Rigid dependence and relational inherence would remain primitive but 
codified in the nature of a relational trope. After this simple move, the Russellian realist need 
not introduce such further primitives as “the non-mereological fact composition” and “fact 
existence”. Since the resulting position introduces fewer different kinds of formal ontological 
relations than factualism without significant losses in explanatory benefits, the Russellian 
realist has strong reasons to adopt it.17 
 
                                               
17 Formal ontological relations characterise the general relations an entity bears as a member of an ontological 
category to distinct entities (of the same or other categories). For instance, they spell out how an entity can exist 
as a constituent of the world (existential dependencies) and how it exists as a constituent of the world 
(mereological relations). They are not further entities but rather constitute an important part of the description of 
the entities in a category system. For further discussion of formal ontological relations, see Smith & Mulligan 
(1983), Lowe (2006, ch. 3), Correia & Keller (2004) and the other articles in the same issue of Dialectica. 
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3. The Location Problem 
 
After having argued that the Russellian realist should reject facts, let us take stock. The version 
of Russellian realism suggested in the previous section is a thing ontology: the instantiations 
of universals are complex things closed under rigid dependence18, constituted by an n-adic 
universal, n+1-adic relational trope of instantiation and n objects. Unlike facts, the 
instantiations are mereological sums of their constituents. 
 It is a widely known fact that relation universals or similar entities are not well suited 
to stop Bradley’s relation regress as construed in contemporary discussions.19 The main reason 
for this is that relation universals are not relata specific: their existence does not entail that they 
connect (or relate) their specific relata.20 By contrast, the relata-specific relational tropes seem 
to stop the regress because we need not postulate any further relations to account for 
instantiations. Although we are not fully convinced of the relata-specific solution in its present 
form, it is clearly preferable to the factualist solution for the reasons spelled out in the previous 
section. One need not be a trope theorist to make use of this solution; the Russellian realist can 
make use of it as well.21 
  On the relational-trope version, instantiations are particulars. This leaves two further 
options: either they are concrete or abstract, that is, either localised or not localised in space-
time. The best empirical examples of monadic property universals are physical quantities (such 
as masses, electric charges and spin quantum numbers), which bestow causal powers on their 
                                               
18 Dependence closures with respect to rigid dependence are groups of entities whose rigid dependencies are 
satisfied inside the group. Arguably, they form rigidly independent existents, cf. Simons 1987, 322. 
19 Because of being universals and not being relata-specific, the fundamental ties of exemplification cannot stop 
the regress either (cf. Bergmann 1967, 9ff.) 
20 After introducing the notion, Wieland & Betti (2008, 519) speculate about the possibility of considering 
universals as relata specific. Nevertheless, this would involve complications, which would be difficult to deal with 
such as the claim that necessarily, if a certain definite relation universal exists, certain definite objects exist and 
the universal relates these objects in different pairs (or triples, etc.) in a certain definite way. 
21 Dodd (1999, 153ff) has suggested avoiding Bradley’s regress by taking instantiations as primitive predications 
without reifying instantiation as an existing relation or relating entity. Whatever its exact merits (e.g., in terms of 
avoidance of facts and necessary connections), the suggested answer fails to deal with Bradley’s relation regress. 
It does not ground contingent instantiations of properties and relations by means of the existence of the entities 
involved. But then, because of the dialectical context, one has to show why Bradley’s regress is not a substantial 
problem. In other words, one should argue why it is not a problem that there are brute contingent connections in 
the world. 
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instances (cf., e.g., Ellis 2001, 115). The fact that these causal powers act in certain spatio-
temporal locations constitutes a strong reason to maintain that also the instantiations of 
universals have a definite spatio-temporal location (that is, are concrete). More generally, 
assuming that there are universals instantiated by concrete particulars, the instantiations of 
universals enter into causal connections and are observed in the locations of these particulars. 
Therefore, also the instantiations of universals seem to be concrete. Assuming that the 
instantiations  of  universals  are  abstract  like  such  alleged  entities  as  sets,  propositions  and  
numbers would leave one with the difficult question why the instantiations of universals can 
differ from these other abstract entities by having effects in the spatio-temporal locations of 
concrete entities. 
Thus, if Russellian universals are abstract, there appear to be concrete entities, concrete 
instantiations of universals that have abstract universals as their constituents. This violates the 
prima facie plausible claim that all constituents of concrete entities are themselves concrete. It 
is, at least, contestable whether non-spatio-temporal (abstract) entities and spatio-temporal 
(concrete) entities can constitute entities localised in space-time.22 This location problem is 
equally pressing for the factualist and the relational-trope versions of Russellian realism. 
 In attempt to answer the location problem, the Russellian realist might go on to maintain 
that, as parts of the space-time realm, all universals are concrete. Nevertheless, few 
metaphysicians have worked out this view in detail.23 As we have argued elsewhere [SELF-
REFERENCE OMITTED], perhaps the most detailed defence of the view due to Cody Gilmore 
(2003) falls into the trap of Lowe’s (1998, 156; 2006, 99) and Ehring’s (2002) incoherence 
arguments against concrete universals. These arguments suffice to show that it is very difficult 
to make sense of the grounding of the locations of concrete universals. Hence, considering 
                                               
22 Parsons (2007, 205-6) defends the contention that hybrid entities constituted by abstract and concrete parts (if 
any) are exactly located in the locations of their concrete parts. He suspects that the intuition that such entities do 
not have exact location is based on "[a] temptation to treat objects not in space as if there were special place "not 
in space" in which those objects are spatially located". Be that as it may, it remains problematic whether such a 
hybrid entity can have a location determined as a function of the locations of its parts. 
23Armstrong (1989, 1997) appears to maintain that, as constituents of the space-time realm, at least all monadic 
universals are concrete. But he does not elucidate how their locations are grounded: are universals in the basic 
spatio-temporal relations? Or do they obtain their locations derivatively, as constituents of spatio-temporally 
located entities? 
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universals as concrete does not seem to be a live option. 
No Russellian realist has been able to tackle the location problem. The only currently 
available coherent view about the location of universals is that universals are abstract, that is, 
do not have any spatio-temporal location. Hence, the realist must reconsider the relation 
between universals and their instances. In what follows, we argue that, in order to improve on 
her position, the realist should adopt tropes and Neo-Aristotelian property universals. The 
resulting view would cease to be a form of Russellian realism and would look very much like 
Neo-Aristotelian realism about properties. 
 
4. Neo-Aristotelian Abstract Universals 
According to Neo-Aristotelian Weak Immanent Realism, all property universals are abstract, 
but have tropes as their instances. Instead of relational tropes, the Neo-Aristotelian introduces 
monadic property tropes to account for instantiations of monadic properties. Instantiation is a 
primitive  formal  ontological  relation  that  connects  abstract  property  universals  and  their  
concrete instances: property tropes instantiate abstract property universals.24 By contrast, 
“instantiation” familiar from the Russellian context, i.e., individual objects instantiating 
property universals (“exemplification” in Lowe’s terms), is analysed by means of two formal 
ontological relations, tropes instantiating property universals and tropes characterising objects 
(Lowe 2006,  40).  The  contingency  of  property  exemplification  is  explained  in  terms  of  the  
contingency of the existence of tropes relative to the existence of the objects they characterise. 
As individual accidents, tropes are rigidly dependent on objects they characterise but the 
converse need not hold (Lowe 2006, 205 ff.). 
 Lowe’s Neo-Aristotelian realism provides us with a more tenable account of the 
relationship between abstract universals and their concrete instantiations than Russellian 
                                               
24 Here, in characterising instantiation as a formal ontological relation connecting property (and substantial kind) 
universals and their instances, we follow Lowe (2006, ch. 3). Although being less explicit in detail, Ellis’s (2001) 
view of the relation between property tropes and their kinds can be characterised in similar manner. 
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realism. Instantiations (or, better, instances) of property universals are tropes. Universals must 
have instances in order to exist but they stand to their instances in exactly one primitive formal 
ontological relation: instantiation. Since instantiation is a primitive formal ontological relation, 
it holds necessarily given the existence of its relata. Since universals are not parts or 
constituents of their instances, the location problem does not arise. 
 Still, the Russellian might have two objections to Neo-Aristotelian realism. First, 
monadic property accidents bring with themselves suspicious rigid dependencies between 
property tropes and objects having these tropes. Are they not mysterious kinds of necessary 
connections between wholly distinct entities?25 Second, according to Russellian realism, all 
properties are universals. By contrast, the Neo-Aristotelian introduces both property universals 
and tropes. Does this not mean ontological extravagance, commitment to unnecessary 
fundamental kinds of entities (cf. Armstrong 1978, 85-86)? Similarly, the Neo-Aristotelian 
introduces two different types of basic formal ontological relation (instantiation and 
characterisation) instead of just one (relational inherence). Does this not amount to a clear 
disadvantage in terms of ideological economy in comparison with the Russellian? 
 As regards the first objection, the Neo-Aristotelian postulates monadic property tropes 
in a formal relation of characterisation to objects. Property tropes with these formal features 
are introduced for certain ontological explanatory work, to account for the instantiations of 
universals. Rigid dependencies, which are entailed by this characterisation connection, get their 
justification from this explanatory work. As we argued in section 2, the Russellian realist 
should postulate relational tropes inhering in, and rigidly dependent on, two distinct entities. 
Relational inherence and multiple rigid dependence hold because the nature of the relational 
trope is to relate its specific relata in a specific manner (cf. Maurin 2002, 164 and Wieland & 
Betti, 2008). With regard to monadic property tropes, the Neo-Aristotelian realist makes a 
parallel claim that it is the nature of a monadic trope to be a property of a certain definite object. 
Hence, the Russellian realist does not have any advantage over the Neo-Aristotelian in avoiding 
                                               
25 Cf. Armstrong’s (1997, 116-117) criticism of “non-transferability” of the tropes C.B. Martin introduces. Since 
Martin’s tropes are individual accidents of substances, the same criticism is probably supposed to apply to all 
individual accidents. 
16 
 
necessary connections. Quite the contrary, instead of monadic inherence, she should invoke a 
more complicated formal relation of relational inherence for grounding instantiations of 
monadic universals. 
 The second objection does not fare well either. Assuming that the Russellian realist 
rejects facts, she needs to postulate basic entities that belong to three fundamental categories: 
objects, property universals and relational tropes. As complex things formed in accordance 
with certain ontological principles, relational complexes are entities of a derived category. In 
turn, the Neo-Aristotelian introduces objects, monadic tropes and property kind universals. 
Thus, there is no difference in the number of fundamental categories introduced to account for 
the exemplifications of property universals.26 
 Things become trickier when we compare these rival schemes in terms of the different 
primitive formal ontological relations. The Neo-Aristotelian needs two different types of 
primitive formal ontological relation (characterisation and instantiation) to account for the 
exemplifications of property universals. By contrast, the Russellian realist seems to be able to 
manage with relational inherence, which binds the relational tropes of instantiation to their 
relata. Nevertheless, as we pointed out above, relational inherence is a more complicated sort 
of formal ontological relation than monadic inherence (or, characterisation): it is supposed to 
bind relational tropes to two distinct relata. Monadic inherence binds property tropes to their 
bearers, which are co-located with the former. By contrast, at least in the special case of 
relational tropes of instantiation, relational inherence connects entities belonging to distinct 
categories (property universals and objects) into a single complex entity. In light of the location 
problem, spelling out how this is possible is extremely difficult as argued in section 3. 
 Hence, considerations pertaining to the number of primitive formal ontological 
relations does not shift the balance in favour of Russellian realism. First, monadic inherence is 
less complicated than relational inherence. Second, by introducing the formal relation of 
instantiation, the Neo-Aristotelian avoids making abstract universals constituents of concrete 
                                               
26 Contemporary Neo-Aristotelians do indeed postulate further fundamental categories for other explanatory 
purposes. An example is Lowe’s (2006; 2013) substantial kind universals. Whether these further postulations are 
needed is a separate issue. 
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entities. 
 
 
5. Conclusion   
 
We have argued that all tenable forms of mainstream realism about universals need to introduce 
tropes in addition to property universals. More precisely, we have argued that Russellian 
realists need to assume tropes; ultimately, if they wish to retain realism, the best available 
option for them is to convert to Neo-Aristotelianism. 
 Facts have often been considered as the main contenders of property tropes. Most 
Russellian realists introduce facts to account for the instantiations of universals and to avoid 
Bradley’s relation regress. In section 2, we argued that the suggested answer to Bradley’s 
regress in terms of fact existence leads to two serious inter-related problems. The first is to give 
a satisfactory account of the category distinction between facts and the mereological sums of 
their constituents. The second is to answer the unity-in-complexity problem, to show that facts 
can be considered as existing single entities over and above aggregates of objects and property 
universals. We argued that factualists have not been able solve these problems as they have not 
managed to specify any intrinsic feature of facts that would account for their unity and the 
category distinction between facts and mereological sums. 
However, the Russellian realist can replace facts with relational tropes of instantiation, 
which are primitive particulars accounting for the instantiations of universals.  They share two 
crucial features with facts: they connect (or relate) certain definite entities (e.g., a certain 
monadic property and a certain particular) and are rigidly dependent on them. The resulting 
version of Russellian realism, described in section 3, makes Russellian property universals, 
objects and relational tropes of instantiation constituents of complex objects, relational 
complexes. While it avoids the difficulties pertaining to facts, the relational-trope version is 
still left with the location problem: how can property universals be abstract (as they are on any 
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plausible conception available), while their instantiations, i.e., relational complexes, are 
concrete. 
We argued in section 4 that the realist about universals can best tackle the location 
problem by replacing Russellian property universals with monadic tropes that are instances of 
property kind universals. On this account, instantiation is considered a primitive formal 
ontological relation connecting abstract property universals and their concrete instances 
(tropes). As a consequence, the realist avoids the location problem because universals do not 
stand in any other formal relation to their instances. On the other hand, the formal relation of 
characterisation between monadic tropes and objects is less problematic than relational 
inherence, on which the Russellian must rely. Thus, in order to give a satisfactory account of 
the instantiations of properties, realists with respect to universals are strongly recommended to 
postulate tropes, and the best available view introduces monadic property tropes. Although the 
resulting position closely resembles the Neo-Aristotelian four- or six-category ontologies 
(Lowe 1998, 2006, 2009; Ellis 2001), the further primitive categories of the Neo-Aristotelian 
schemes (e.g., substantial kind universals, processes, dynamic kind universals) need an 
independent motivation. 
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